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Three Essays on
Nonwage Compensation
Matthew S. Johnson
An employment relationship consists of many dimensions
other than monetary compensation. Textbook economic
theory implies that employers and employees will agree on
an efficient level of such nonwage compensation based on
an employee’s preferences and the employer’s cost. At the
same time, most types of nonwage compensation are set in a
context of substantial regulation, legal restrictions, and other
interventions. This dissertation investigates how the institutional environment—including regulation, media coverage
of corporate actions, and the strength of the labor market—
affects firms’ decisions regarding two important types of
nonwage compensation: workplace safety and health, and
employment mobility.
Chapter 1 investigates how media coverage of employers
caught violating workplace safety and health regulations
affects future compliance and injuries. Using quasi-random
variation in media coverage induced by a policy change at
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
I find that media coverage about one employer leads to
significantly higher compliance, and fewer serious injuries
among other employers likely exposed to the coverage. The
results are most consistent with employers acting defensively
to avoid costly responses from workers, and they suggest
there is information asymmetry between employers and
workers regarding employers’ safety and health performance.
Chapter 2 examines how workplaces respond to health
and safety regulatory enforcement inspections. Using
establishment-level data on injuries, illnesses, and other
business outcomes, we find that randomly assigned OSHA
inspections led to significantly fewer injuries and had no
detectable effect on business outcomes at inspected workplaces. We then use new machine learning methods to
estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of inspections, and
we use the results to simulate how many additional injuries OSHA could avert if it targeted its limited inspection
resources to the workplaces where they are most beneficial.
Chapter 3 investigates why employers have employees
sign noncompete agreements (NCAs), which contractually
limit where the employee can work in the event of a job
separation. NCAs may solve hold-up problems that limit
incentives to invest in transferrable assets (e.g., general
human capital), but they impose costs on employees who
sign them. Recent evidence that NCAs are frequently used
in many traditionally lower-paying occupations has raised
questions about the rationale for, and effects of, NCA use
in this setting. We develop a model of how labor market
conditions and wage frictions (e.g., the minimum wage) can
jointly determine the decision to include an NCA in a hiring
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contract, even if NCAs reduce the firm’s total surplus. We
find strong support for the model’s predictions using a survey
we conducted among employers in the high-end hair salon
industry. Furthermore, we generate a test for identifying
when NCAs do not maximize a firm’s surplus, and we identify a subset of firms in our sample, characterized by limited
access to credit, for which this is the case.
Note: Since this dissertation was accepted in August 2016,
I have updated the three chapters to varying degrees (e.g., by
adding new analysis) that strengthen the papers but do not
change the motivations, implications, or main results. The
chapter summaries below correspond to the current versions.
After each summary, I briefly describe how the current versions differ from my dissertation.

Chapter 1
Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects
of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety
and Health Laws
Ratings, scores, disclosure, and other means of informing a firm’s stakeholders about an aspect of its quality or
performance have proliferated in recent years (Dranove and
Jin 2010). Such policies are guided by the basic economic
insight that, when quality is imperfectly observed, providing
information mitigates a moral hazard problem that distorts
firms’ incentives to invest in quality. Indeed, a growing
empirical literature has found that providing information
about quality to the public leads rated, scored, or otherwise
disclosed firms to improve the quality of the attributes under
scrutiny.1
Many sources seek to disclose information only about
firms whose quality or performance is particularly low:
that is, “shaming.” For example, nongovernmental organizations and media outlets compile lists of firms that fail in
some dimension according to objective data sources, such
as “Least Green Companies in America” (Newsweek 2010),
or the campaigns against companies that used sweatshop
labor in the 1990s (Harrison and Scorse 2010). Increasingly, technology and social media have enabled customers,
former workers, and other stakeholders to expose companies’ actions ranging from tax avoidance (Barford and Holt
2013), high medical drug prices,2 and sexual harassment of
employees.3 While one intent of such tactics is to pressure
the entity being targeted to improve its behavior (“specific
deterrence”), a broader and perhaps more important intent is
to encourage improvements in quality at other entities that
wish to avoid being the target of their own future negative publicity (“general deterrence”). Despite the growing
prevalence of these policies, little is known about how firms
respond to such information disclosure targeted only at the
worst performers. Estimating their effects poses substan-
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tial empirical challenges due to the purposely nonrandom
selection of entities that are publicized, to the difficulty in
knowing which other entities are the most likely respond
to general deterrence, and to a dearth in data on outcomes
typically under scrutiny.
This paper overcomes these challenges. Specifically,
I investigate a policy dubbed “regulation by shaming”
implemented by OSHA (Michaels 2010). In 2009 OSHA,
the regulatory agency charged with setting and enforcing
workplace safety and health standards in the United States,
began issuing press releases about facilities found to be violating safety and health standards in a recent inspection. The
policy was intended to expose egregious violators to public
scrutiny and to publicize OSHA’s enforcement actions. These
press releases described the violations found in a recent
inspection of a facility and the financial penalties levied, and
they implied that the employer was exposing its workers to
substantial safety and health hazards.
The initiation of OSHA’s press release policy provides an
ideal setting to understand the scale, scope, and persistence
with which publicizing poor performance affects firms’
behavior. First, OSHA used a cutoff rule whereby it issued
a press release about a facility’s violations if the financial
penalties it levied at a recent inspection were above a certain
threshold. This rule provides quasi-random variation in publicity among otherwise similar facilities that lends itself to a
Regression Discontinuity design. Second, OSHA distributed
these press releases to local newspapers and industry trade
publications, meaning that other facilities in close geographic
proximity and in the same industry were most likely to be
exposed to publicity of a press release. The policy was only
announced internally within OSHA and not made known to
the general public. As a result, it led to a sharp and unexpected increase in media coverage of OSHA violations, and
meant that a well-defined set of facilities were made aware
of this new threat of media coverage. Third, OSHA routinely
inspects a broad set of workplaces to detect health and safety
violations and collects the results in an internal database,
providing a timely and systematic data source to measure
facility improvements in response to press releases.
Understanding the extent to which publicity like this
affects workplace safety and health is not only useful to
understand how firms respond to targeted information disclosure, but it is also an important question for public policy;
although U.S. workplace injury rates have declined in recent
decades, they continue to have substantial welfare costs, with
one recent study estimating that they cost the United States
$250 billion per year (Leigh 2011).
I find that press releases revealing OSHA noncompliance
lead to substantial improvements in workplace safety and
health. A press release about one facility leads to 1.7 fewer
violations at other facilities in the same sector within a 5
kilometer radius (“peer facilities”), a decrease of 73 percent.
To put the magnitude of this deterrence effect in perspective,
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an OSHA inspection has been estimated to lead to between
28 and 48 percent fewer violations at later inspections of the
same facility (Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2012). Thus, this
paper’s estimates imply that publicizing violations committed by one facility leads other peer facilities to improve compliance by two to three times as much as if OSHA inspected
each of these facilities instead. Given that inspections are
relatively costly and that OSHA’s budget constraints—like
those in many other regulatory agencies—dictate that it can
inspect only a small subset of regulated workplaces, this publicity appears to be a highly effective policy tool to improve
workplace safety.
Furthermore, using the occurrence of OSHA inspections
triggered by a fatal, or otherwise very serious, workplace
injury, I find that press releases lead not only to improved
compliance with OSHA regulations, but also to fewer injuries. An inspection with penalties just above the press release
cutoff leads to significantly fewer inspections triggered by a
serious accident among other peer facilities. The magnitude
of the effect, as with compliance, is substantial.
The paper then tests for mechanisms through which
OSHA’s press releases lead facilities to improve their safety
and health performance. One theory is that facilities improve
compliance to avoid costly responses from stakeholders,
especially workers. Workers who have more bargaining power
may have more scope to leverage a press release to demand
safer working conditions, or a larger compensating differential
for job hazards, from an employer. Drawing from literature on
how the presence of labor unions affects workers’ bargaining
power (both at unionized and nonunionized workplaces), I
measure workers’ bargaining power using two proxies for the
strength of labor unions: whether a facility is in a right-towork state, and the baseline unionization rate of a facility’s
county. Using either measure, facilities in areas where unions
are strong improve compliance by a substantial amount
following a press release about a peer (regardless of their own
unionization); those in areas where unions are relatively weak
display no improvement. In other words, press releases lead
to improvements in safety and health conditions only when
workers are most likely to be able to use information about an
employer’s safety record to respond in a costly way.
This paper makes multiple contributions. First, it provides
a novel contribution to a literature on the disciplinary effects
of information provision. While a growing body of work
(such as those papers cited in note 1) has investigated the
extent to, and conditions under, which information disclosure leads firms to improve their performance or quality, this
paper is one of the first to identify how providing information about some targeted firms can have broader effects on
the behavior of other firms. A separate literature has explored
the effect of “shaming” in other domains, such as public
release of criminal records (Lee 2013) and tax delinquency
(Perez-Truglia and Troaino 2016). In the realm of politics,
media coverage has been shown to affect politicians’ incen-
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tives to engage in malfeasant behavior (Snyder and Stromberg 2010). This paper builds on these literatures by exploring how shaming—and targeted information disclosure in
general—affects firm behavior in a regulatory environment.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the
determinants of regulatory compliance in firms. Many prior
studies have investigated the specific deterrence effects of
OSHA inspections on future compliance of inspected facilities (Gray and Jones 1991; Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2010;
Weil 1996), as well as effects in other regulatory domains
such as by the Environmental Protection Agency (see Alm
and Shimshack [2014] for an overview). At least in the
environmental domain, the consensus in this literature seems
to be that “rigorous monitoring and enforcement remains
the number one motivator for many facilities’ environmental
compliance decisions” (Gray and Shimshack 2011, p. 1).
This paper’s findings suggest the media and “shaming” have
been overlooked as powerful forces governing firms’ compliance decisions, at least for safety and health.
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my dissertation used shared zip code, rather than geographic distance,
as a measure of geographic proximity when estimating
general deterrence effects of press releases (the substance of
the results is unchanged). That version also did not analyze
the effects of press releases on occupational injuries, and it
also did not analyze how labor union strength moderates the
effect of press releases on compliance.

Chapter 2
Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through
Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA
(with David I. Levine and Michael W. Toffel)
Government agencies spend billions of dollars to send
inspectors to assess compliance with regulations governing,
for example, worker safety, environmental protection, and
product safety.4 Budget constraints require almost all regulators to monitor a small subset of regulated units. For example, in 2016 OSHA and its state counterparts inspected less
than 1 percent of the 8 million workplaces they regulated.
(U.S. Department of Labor 2017b). Other agencies face
similar discrepancies between the scale of their resources and
scope of their jurisdiction.5
Such constraints require regulators to make difficult
choices about how to prioritize their inspections. Agencies
prioritize inspections based on various statutory requirements, heuristics, and algorithms. For example, OSHA
allocates most of its inspections to facilities that recently
experienced serious accidents, had employee complaints, or
dangerous workplaces in high-hazard industries.6
Assessing agencies’ effectiveness is a challenging task.
First, it is difficult to know if agencies’ inspections are
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furthering their goals at all; agencies choose which establishments to inspect, which makes it hard to find a credible
comparison group of uninspected establishments for evaluation purposes. Second, it is even more difficult to know
if agencies are maximizing their effectiveness. Even if one
could credibly evaluate the average effects of inspections as
agencies currently target them, conventional econometric
methods do not tell us if current targeting is optimal. The
lack of robust evidence of inspection effectiveness has left
government agencies susceptible to criticism that their efforts
waste taxpayer dollars, that they target establishments to promote politicians’ agendas (Weisman and Wald 2013), or that
they serve the interests of those they regulate (Stigler 1971).
In this paper, we combine a large randomized experiment
with machine learning methods, which yields an approach to
assess the extent to which regulatory agencies are maximizing the benefits of their limited inspection resources. We do
so by first identifying establishments where inspections do
the most to accomplish the agency’s objectives, and we then
simulate outcomes if the agency adopted various policies that
targeted those establishments.
We conduct our analysis in the context of a major inspection program of OSHA, which has been highly controversial
since its creation in 1970. While its supporters argue the
agency saves lives at little to no cost to employers, critics
charge that its regulations add costs but “don’t add value to
safety in the workforce” (Heitkamp 2016), or that its penalties for noncompliance are too low for OSHA to have any
effect at all (Bartel and Thomas 1985).
We first evaluate the extent to which a subset of inspections that OSHA randomly assigned under its Site-Specific
Targeting (SST) program affected the injury rates of
inspected workplaces. SST, one of OSHA’s largest inspection programs from 2001 to 2010, prioritized for inspection
establishments that had experienced high injury rates two
years earlier, a rule intended to allow “the most effective use
of OSHA’s limited resources” (U.S. Department of Labor
2009). By focusing on random assignment, our estimates
are free of selection bias that plague most comparisons of
inspected and uninspected establishments.7 The roughly
16,000 establishments at risk of randomized SST inspection over this period employed nearly 2.5 million workers,
making this the largest group-level randomized control trial
of which we are aware.
On average, we find that randomly assigned SST inspections reduced serious injuries (those leading to days away
from work [DAFW]) by 9 percent over the five years following the inspection. This equates to 2.4 fewer DAFW-injuries
over the five years following inspection, amounting to a
social benefit of $105,000 per inspection, based on a prior
estimate that DAFW-injuries typically cost $44,000 (Waehrer et al. 2007). We find no evidence that these benefits of
inspections came with a cost to business outcomes such as
establishment survival, employment, sales, or credit rating.

17

We then investigate the potential benefits of alternative
targeting policies that OSHA could adopt. Conducting this
analysis is challenged by the fact that a particular establishment’s treatment effect of an inspection on its number
of injuries—that is, the difference in the number of injuries
it would experience if had been inspected versus had it not
been inspected—is unobservable. When there are many factors that could moderate an inspection’s effect, conventional
methods to estimate such heterogeneous treatment effects
(such as adding interaction terms) risk estimating spurious
interactions that have poor out-of-sample predictive power.
To overcome this challenge, we employ a machinelearning approach that yields data-driven estimates of each
establishment’s treatment effect based on its baseline characteristics called Targeted Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(TMLE) (van der Laan and Rose 2011). We first obtain an
initial estimate of each establishment’s outcome if inspected
and outcome if not inspected, using a procedure called
“super learner” (van der Laan, Polley, and Hubbard 2007).
Super learner is an ensemble machine-learning prediction
technique that uses cross-validation to create an optimal linear combination of machine-learning prediction algorithms.
TMLE then fluctuates this initial estimate to minimize bias
of the estimated average treatment effect. As a result, TMLE
provides estimates to overcome the fundamental problem of
causal inference (Holland 1986), estimating the counterfactual number of injuries if inspected among those that were
not inspected, and number of injuries if not inspected among
those that were inspected.
We estimate substantial heterogeneity in the degree to
which SST inspection affects serious injuries. Armed with
these estimates, we examine how different targeting policies
could improve OSHA’s effectiveness. For example, if OSHA
reallocated all its SST inspections to target those establishments with the largest predicted treatment effects each year,
which we consider our “benchmark” policy, it could have
averted 58 percent more injuries at inspected establishments
than the historical rule.
While this benchmark policy could avert many more
injuries at inspected establishments, elements of it may be
undesirable. For example, shifting the allocation of inspections may increase OSHA’s cost of conducting inspections,
requiring extra resources OSHA may not have. Furthermore,
OSHA may want to preserve a degree of randomization to
maintain effects that the threat of inspection has on uninspected establishments (Cohen 2000; Shimshack and Ward
2005). When we examine a policy that maintains OSHA’s
historical overall cost of conducting inspections, and which
preserves a degree of randomization, we find it still increases
the injuries averted among inspected establishments by 42
percent relative to the historical policy.
Another potential concern with our benchmark policy is
that a government agency might be leery of targeting inspections based on the output of a “black box” machine-learning
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algorithm like TMLE. We thus consider policies in which
OSHA bases its targeting policy on two transparent measures of hazardousness: predicted number of DAFW injuries
or predicted noncompliance with OSHA regulations. We
estimate these predicted values using a Lasso regression, a
standard (and simpler) machine learning tool for prediction.
OSHA would still avert 70 percent as many injuries if targeting based on the predicted number of DAFW injuries as
it would by targeting based on the largest treatment effects.
Targeting based on predicted noncompliance, in contrast,
only increased averted injuries slightly compared to the
historical rule.
In sum, considering a policy that accounts for each of
these potential concerns of our benchmark policy, our estimates imply that targeting OSHA’s SST inspections differently could have created social value of roughly $220 million
over a decade.
This paper makes multiple contributions. We add to a
large literature examining the effects of OSHA inspections
on injuries, which to date has yielded a wide range of estimates. While many early studies find that OSHA inspections
have little or no correlation with subsequent workplace
injury rates (Ruser and Smith 1991; Smith 1979b; Viscusi
1986), others find that OSHA inspections are associated with
a decline in injury rates (Gray and Scholz 1993; Haviland et
al. 2012; Levine, Toffel, and Johnson 2012). We depart from
this literature in two important ways. First, by evaluating
the average effects of a subset of OSHA inspections that
were randomly assigned, our approach yields credible causal
estimates for the subset of inspections we study. Second,
we go beyond evaluating historical effects of inspections to
examine the implications of alternative inspection policies,
allowing us to determine the extent to which OSHA could
reallocate inspections to avert more injuries.
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my dissertation did not include the results that use TMLE to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects of inspections. Rather, that
version used a different machine-learning procedure (Lasso)
to estimate establishments’ predicted injuries and predicted
noncompliance, and analyzed the extent to which these
measures accounted for heterogeneity in the effectiveness of
inspections.

Chapter 3
Cutting Out the Competition:
Labor Market Conditions and the Use
of Noncompete Agreements
(with Michael Lipsitz)
When a new worker receives his or her employment contract, it may include a noncompete agreement (NCA), which
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contractually limits the worker’s ability to enter a professional position in competition with his or her employer in the
event of a job separation. Economic theory of the hold-up
problem (Grossman and Hart 1986) suggests that NCAs
can potentially enhance efficiency by aligning incentives
to invest in various assets, such as general human capital
training, trade secrets, or client lists. At the same time, NCAs
may also impose significant costs on workers by limiting
their ability to pursue outside employment opportunities.
Recent evidence suggests that our understanding of the
reasons behind—and implications of—NCA use remains
incomplete. For one, while NCAs are most prevalent in
higher-skill, knowledge-intensive industries and occupations,
they are also frequently used in many traditionally lowerpaying occupations (Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 2015), even
among fast food workers (Irwin 2014), leading some to question what benefit NCAs could be bringing to these employment relationships. Furthermore, the use of NCAs has been
growing in recent years (Greenhouse 2014), which, absent
corresponding changes in the importance of training, trade
secrets, client lists, or other facets of production technology, is difficult to rationalize with the theory of the hold-up
problem alone.
These developments have captured policymakers’ attention: in Congress, the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act,8 introduced on June 4, 2015,
would prohibit NCAs for workers earning less than $15 per
hour, and bills with similar intents have been introduced by
several state legislatures.9 Despite this policy interest, little is
known about the efficiency of NCAs in this context, let alone
the rationale for their use in the first place.
In this paper, we show that NCAs arise when employers
and employees are limited in their ability to transfer utility via the wage. When the market-clearing wage is constrained, NCAs may be used as a tool to transfer additional
surplus to the employer, even if NCAs do not maximize an
employer and employee’s joint surplus. In fact, such constraints on wages will only affect NCA use if NCAs are not
surplus-maximizing. Thus, we provide a simple method that
generates a sufficient condition to determine when NCAs do
not maximize surplus in firms: if a change in the bindingness
of a wage constraint affects NCA use, NCAs cause a joint
surplus loss (relative to a contract without an NCA) for at
least a subset of firms. We implement this test using data
from a survey we conducted of employers in the hair salon
industry.
We start with a simple, perfectly competitive model of
the labor market in which NCAs provide a benefit to the
employer and impose a cost on the employee. If utility is
fully transferable between the employer and employee via
the wage, NCAs will be used only when the firm’s net benefit
of NCA use is positive: when NCAs maximize joint surplus.
However, when utility transferability via the wage is limited,
the terms of trade in the labor market may dictate that NCAs
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are used as a tool to transfer surplus from the employee to
the employer, even if NCAs do not maximize firms’ surplus.
NCA use will therefore increase when the terms of trade
become more favorable to the employer or when transferability of utility decreases.
While firms plausibly have many possible nonpecuniary instruments for surplus transfer at their disposal, there
are reasons to believe NCAs would be a prominent one.
First, prior research has identified clear ways NCAs benefit employers. For example, because NCAs lead to longer
worker tenure (Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 2015), they can
reduce employee replacement costs, which can be substantial
(Dube, Freeman, and Reich 2010). Additionally, in industries
for which production depends on transferable assets such
as client lists and general human capital, ensuring retention
of these assets is extremely valuable. Second, relative to
other nonpecuniary job attributes such as provision of health
care, it is relatively easy for employers to switch in and out
of using NCAs; NCA use requires straightforward changes
to employment contracts, whereas adjustments to health
insurance benefits requires much more coordination, time,
and resources.
To test the empirical predictions of our model, we surveyed owners of independent hair salons in April 2015 via
the Professional Beauty Association, a trade association for
the industry. The benefits of NCAs are clear in this setting
due to the importance of client attraction and retention in
production, and the prevalence of on-the-job training. At the
same time, due to state-level occupational licensing laws that
make mobility costly, the costs of NCAs to workers are also
potentially high. We find that NCAs are widely used: 30 percent of our sample had their most recently hired stylist sign
an NCA, and 39 percent have had at least one stylist sign an
NCA in the past.
Taking the model to the data, we find strong empirical
support that limitations on transferability of utility via the
wage affect NCA use. First, we test the prediction that NCA
use is higher when the terms of trade in the labor market
are more favorable for the employer. We find that outward
shifts in labor supply (proxied by the number of applicants an owner received for her most recent vacancy), and
increases to the local unemployment rate—both of which
will be associated with a lower market-clearing wage—are
related to higher NCA use. We estimate that one additional
applicant for a vacancy leads to a 4 percent increase in the
probability that the hired worker signed an NCA. We also
find that salons in counties that experienced higher increases
in the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2012 (roughly
the period spanning the Great Recession) were more likely to
have their most recently hired worker sign an NCA.
Second, we find that increases in the minimum wage,
which limit transferability of utility, also have a strong effect
on NCA use. Owners in states with a higher minimum wage
for tipped employees are more likely to use NCAs. Because
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cross-sectional variation in the minimum wage might be
driven by other, unobservable differences across states, we
separately estimate the effect of the minimum wage on NCA
use for salons that hire workers as employees versus those
that hire as independent contractors. The latter group is not
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and thus acts as
a “placebo group” for the minimum wage. The effect only
holds for the employment-based salons in our sample and
is small and statistically insignificant for contractor-based
salons. Among employment-based salons, a $1.00 increase in
the minimum wage is associated with an 8 percentage point
increase in the probability that an owner has used a NCA in
an employment contract.
Combined with the implications of our model, these
results imply that NCAs do not maximize surplus for at
least some firms in our sample. However, NCAs may still
be surplus-maximizing contracts for a subset of firms. For
example, if the benefits of NCAs are heterogeneous across
employers, NCAs may maximize surplus for those firms with
the highest benefit.
To investigate the extent of variation in the benefit of
NCAs in our sample, we first corroborate existing evidence that one benefit of NCAs is to enhance incentives for
employers to invest in production assets, and we then utilize
a measure of employers’ ability to invest in production assets
originating in the corporate finance literature: access to a line
of credit with a bank (Sufi 2009). We find evidence consistent with NCAs being surplus-maximizing for employers
with high capacity for investment, but not for those with
low capacity. Employers with high capacity use NCAs at a
high rate, regardless of whether the market-clearing wage is
likely constrained. On the other hand, employers with low
capacity are highly unlikely to use NCAs in an unconstrained
environment (proxied by a low minimum wage, low level
of labor supply, or low local unemployment rate), but this
likelihood increases as the wage becomes constrained.
Overall, these results highlight a potential explanation
for the growth of NCAs among lower-wage occupations
and industries in recent years. Between 2007 and 2009, the
federal minimum wage rose from $5.15 per hour to $7.25 per
hour, and several states have increased their minimum wage
in more recent years. Furthermore, in the wake of the Great
Recession, there is a consensus that the labor market has
deteriorated dramatically, especially for low-wage workers.
Our results imply that employers leveraged this weak labor
market to use NCAs as a tool to extract additional surplus
from workers.
Thus, our results yield nuanced implications for policy.
On the one hand, our survey results suggest that NCAs
may arise as a tool for employers to extract surplus from
workers in weak labor markets, reducing joint surplus and
leaving workers worse off. At the same time, even within a
narrowly defined industry, we find that NCAs do not maximize surplus for some firms but do for others. This finding
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stresses the need for future research to further investigate
the benefits NCAs provide to firms, which can aid policymakers by pinpointing where NCAs are most likely to be
surplus-diminishing.
This paper contributes to a growing literature examining
the rationale for NCAs and the effects of their use. Using
variation in the enforceability of NCAs across states, an
increase in NCA enforceability has been found to increase
firm-sponsored training (Starr 2017) and decrease employee
mobility (Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming 2009). We add to the
literature by empirically demonstrating how forces external
to the firm influence the decision to use NCAs in the first
place, and by providing a method to identify the presence of
NCAs that do not maximize a firm’s joint surplus. We also
conduct the first survey on NCA use with employer information, allowing us to explore determinants and effects of
NCA use not available through worker surveys or variation
in enforceability.
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my dissertation did not include the analysis of how changes to the
local unemployment rate affect NCA use.
Notes
1. Some examples are restaurant hygiene report cards (Jin and
Leslie 2003), disclosure of drinking-water quality (Bennear
and Olmstead 2008), and environmental ratings (Chatterji and
Toffel 2010). See Dranove and Jin (2010) for an overview of
the literature.
2. “Social Media Shaming: Can Outrage Be Effective?” Knowledge@Wharton, November 20, 2015. http://knowledge
.wharton.upenn.edu/article/social-media-shaming-can-out
rage-be-effective/ (accessed October 25, 2017).
3. “Uber Orders Investigation into Sexual Harassment Claims,”
February 20, 2017. NPR, All Things Considered. http://www
.npr.org/2017/02/20/516292319/uber-orders-investigation
-into-sexual-harassment-claims (accessed October 25, 2017).
4. Three examples are illustrative. OSHA and its state counterparts
spent more than $300 million on enforcement in 2016 (U.S.
Department of Labor 2017a). Second, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency spends more than $600 million per year on
enforcement, which does not include inspections performed
by state-level environmental agencies, which actually led the
efforts to enforce environmental regulation in the United States
(Shimshack 2014). Third, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) allocated roughly two-thirds of its $1 billion Office
of Regulatory Affairs budget to inspections in fiscal year 2015
(U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2016).
5. For example, FDA is charged with ensuring imported products
meet FDA standards but in 2010 only physically inspected 2
percent of imported food products (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services 2010).
6. “OSHA Fact Sheet: OSHA Inspections,” https://www.osha
.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf
(accessed February 2017).
7. For example, because many OSHA inspections target establishments with recent accidents or complaints, inspected
establishments likely have systematically different character-
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istics (both observable and unobservable) than noninspected
establishments. Furthermore, establishments experiencing high
injury rates in one year (thus triggering an OSHA inspection)
may experience fewer injuries the following year simply due to
regression to the mean, in which case OSHA inspections would
be correlated with lower injury rates without actually causing
them.
8. Senate Bill S. 1504. Full text available at https://www.govtrack
.us/congress/bills/114/s1504.
9. Some examples include Washington (HB 1926; introduced February 2, 2015), Utah (HB 251; introduced February 1, 2016),
and Illinois (Illinois Freedom to Work Act; goes into effect
January 1, 2017).

References
Alm, James, and Jay Shimshack. 2014. “Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution,
Safety, and Tax Settings.” Foundations and Trends in
Microeconomics 10(4): 209–274.
Barford, Vanessa, and Gerry Holt. 2013. “Google, Amazon,
Starbucks: The Rise of ‘Tax Shaming.’” BBC Magazine,
May 21. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359
(accessed October 25, 2017).
Bartel, Ann P., and Lacey Glenn Thomas. 1985. “Direct and
Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA’s
Impact.” Journal of Law and Economics 28(1): 1–25.
Bennear, Lori S., and Sheila M. Olmstead. 2008. “The
Impacts of the ‘Right to Know’: Information Disclosure
and the Violation of Drinking Water Standards.” Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 56(2):
117–130.
Chatterji, Aaron K., and Michael W. Toffel. 2010. “How
Firms Respond to Being Rated.” Strategic Management
Journal 31(9): 917–945.
Dranove, David, and Ginger Zhe Jin. 2010. “Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice.” Journal of
Economic Literature 48(4): 935–963.
Dube, Arindrajit, Eric Freeman, and Michael Reich. 2010.
“Employee Replacement Costs.” Working Paper No.
201-10. Berkeley: Institute for Research on Labor and
Employment.
Gray, Wayne B., and Carol Adaire Jones. 1991. “Longitudinal Patterns of Compliance with Occupational Safety and
Health Administration Health and Safety Regulations in
the Manufacturing Sector.” Journal of Human Resources
26(4): 623–653.
Gray, Wayne B., and John T. Scholz. 1993. “Does Regulatory
Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement.” Law and Society Review 27(1): 177–214.
Greenhouse, Steven. 2014. “Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs.” New York Times, June 8.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/
noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs
.html (accessed October 26, 2017).
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1986. “The Costs
2017 Dissertation Summaries

and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94(4):
691–719.
Harrison, Ann, and Jason Scorse. 2010. “Multinationals and
Anti-Sweatshop Activism.” American Economic Review
100(1): 247–273.
Haviland, Amelia M., Rachel M. Burns, Wayne B. Gray,
Teague Ruder, and John Mendeloff. 2012. “A New Estimate of the Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing
Injury Rates, 1998–2005.” American Journal of Industrial
Medicine 55(11): 964–975.
Heitkamp, Heidi. 2016. Hearing with Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, February
11. http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/
13662-compliance-assistance-not-fines-should-be-priority
-senators-tell-osha (accessed October 31, 2017).
Irwin, Neil. “When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a
Noncompete Clause.” New York Times, October 14. https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/when-the-guy
-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html
(accessed October 26, 2017).
Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Philip Leslie. 2003. “The Effect of
Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant
Hygiene Cards.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2):
409–451.
Ko, Kilkon, John Mendeloff, and Wayne B. Gray. 2010. “The
Role of Inspection Sequence in Compliance with the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA)
Standards: Interpretations and Implications.” Regulation &
Governance 4(1): 48–70.
Levine, David I., Michael W. Toffel, and Matthew S. Johnson. 2012. “Randomized Government Safety Inspections
Reduce Worker Injuries with No Detectable Job Loss.”
Science 336(6083): 907–911.
Leigh, J. Paul. 2011. “Economic Burden of Occupational
Injury and Illness in the United States.” Milbank Quarterly
89(4): 728–772.
Marx, Matt, Deborah Anne Strumsky, and Lee Fleming.
2009. “Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Noncompete
Experiment.” Management Science 55(6): 875–889.
Michaels, David. 2010. “OSHA at Forty: New Challenges
and New Directions.” Letter to OSHA staff, July 19.
Newsweek. 2010. “Least Green Companies in America: Photos.” October 16. http://www.newsweek.com/
least-green-companies-america-photos-68107 (accessed
October 25, 2017).
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, and Ugo Troiano. 2016. “Shaming Tax Delinquents: Theory and Evidence from a Field
Experiment in the United States.” NBER Working Paper
No. 21264. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Ruser, John W., and Robert S. Smith. 1991. “Reestimating Osha’s Effects: Have the Data Changed?” Journal of
Human Resources 26(2): 212–235.

21

